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,QVWLWXWLRQDOLVLQJ.DQW·V3ROLWLFDO3KLORVRSK\)RUHJURXQGLQJ&RVPRSROLWDQ5LJKW 
 
$PRQJWKHGHEDWHVWKDWDWWHQGWRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI,PPDQXHO.DQW·Vpolitical philosophy is an 
institutional question: does such a philosophy entail a federal world government 
(Weltrepublik/Völkerstaat), or instead only a confederal ¶OHDJXHRIQDWLRQV· (Völkerbund)?i To ask this 
question is not to ask what Kant himself actually thought ² a vexed issue in itself, given his 
apparent inconsistency on the matter across various of his works. Rather, it is to ask which 
institutional form can be best rendered consistent with WKHFRQWHQWRI.DQW·VSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\
UHJDUGOHVV RI ZKDW .DQW·V RZQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO YLHZ PD\ DFWXDOO\ KDYH EHHQ 7R SDUDSKUDVH RQH
contributor to the debate, it is to ask what Kant ² and any Kantian ² should say (Carson, 1988).  
 For some Kant scholars, the proper Kantian answer to the institutional question is world 
JRYHUQPHQW)RUWKRVHRIWKLVSHUVXDVLRQLIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO´VXUURJDWHµRIDOHDJXHRIQDWLRQV has 
a role, then this is only as political necessity, or as a temporary transitional institution on the way 
to eventual global sovereignty (e.g. Carson; 1988; Lutz-Bachman, 1997; Habermas; 2006; Höffe, 
2006; Byrd and Hruschka, 2008; Hodgson, 2012; Kleingeld, 2012). On the other side of the 
argument, however, are those who argue that therHDUHJRRGQRUPDWLYHUHDVRQVLQWHUQDOWR.DQW·V
political philosophy, for the rejection of a world government and endorsement instead of a 
confederal league (e.g. Cavallar, 1994; Brown, 2009; Ripstein, 2009; Flikschuh 2010; Capps and 
Rivers 2010; Mikalsen, 2011; Varden, 2011; Raponi 2014; Holland 2017). 
 This debate, however, has to date been conducted with focus upon one of the three forms 
of ¶SXEOLFULJKW· at the KHDUWRI.DQW·VSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\QDPHO\¶international right·. It has here 
either been argued that the need for a world government follows by simple analogy with the 
requirement for individuals to join together in a state LQRUGHUWRUHDOLVH¶GRPHVWLF rLJKW·RUHOVHLW
has been claimed that the international context is sufficiently disanalogous to the individual 
context that a league of nations is instead the correct answer. In neither approach is much attention 
paid to the third form of right, namely ¶FRVPRSROLWDQULJKW·WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIZKLFK
remain underexplored. In one sense this is understandable, because Kant himself does not address 
the institutional question with specific reference to cosmopolitan right. But it is nevertheless also 
surprising, because the systematic, multi-level nature of the ¶GRFWULQH RI ULJKW· ² comprising 
domestic, international and cosmopolitan forms ² is well recognised. Kant makes this systematic 
nature plain when he writes that ´LIWKHSULQFLSOHRIRXWHU freedom limited by law [i.e. public right] 
is lacking in any of [the] three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of all the others 
LV XQDYRLGDEO\ XQGHUPLQHG DQG PXVW ILQDOO\ FROODSVHµ00 ii Since this is the case, it 
cannot be sufficient, when considering the institutional question, to restrict our focus to 
international right, because in doing so we remain ignorant about whether the institution we deem 
appropriate for the realisation of international right, considered in abstraction, renders 
cosmopolitan rLJKW ´ODFNLQJµ  :KDW·V QHHGHG LQ RUGHU SURSHUO\ WR FRQVLGHU WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO
question, is to bring cosmopolitan right into view. That is the purpose of this paper.  
 After first explicating the content of cosmopolitan right ² and in particular, arguing for a 
reading of cosmopolitan right that includes a modest right of asylum ² the paper will proceed in a 
way that might be described as dialectical. The bulk of the paper focusses on the arguments that 
are made in defence of a league of nations in discussion of international right. These two arguments 
contend that the demands of rLJKWDV WKH\DSSO\ WR LQGLYLGXDOV LQD ¶VWDWHRIQDWXUH·FDQQRWEH
simply transposed to states in a second, international state of nature. Both of these arguments 
HPSKDVLVHDGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWRIVWDWHV·VXSSRVHG´SHUVRQKRRGµDVDUHDVRQWRUHMHFWVXFKVLPSle 
WUDQVSRVLWLRQWKHILUVWDSSHDOVWRVWDWHV·GLVWLQFWLYHPRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\WKHVHFRQGWRVWDWHV·SK\VLFDO
manifestation. This paper, however, asks what happens when we transpose these arguments into 
the context of cosmopolitan right, and are thus confronted with the personhood of the individual 
asylum seeker. My answer is that it becomes clear that such arguments cannot succeed as full 
defences of a league of nations as the answer to the institutional question; indeed I shall argue that, 
when the cosmopolitan context is brought into view, they point instead ² either tentatively or 
definitively ² in the direction of world government.  
 
Cosmopolitan right 
:KLOH ¶LQWHUQDO IUHHGRP· LV WKH FRQFHUQ RI .DQW·V PRUDO philosophy, his political philosophy 
instead FRQFHUQV¶H[WHUQDOIUHHGRP·.iii ,QWHUQDOIUHHGRPUHIHUVWRSHUVRQV·DXWRQRPRXVZLOOLQJRI
maxims of action in accordance with principles of pure practical reason, and independent of 
subjective, arbitrary desire. Unlike internal freedom, external freedom is an inherently relational 
LGHD)RU.DQWHDFKSHUVRQ´ E\YLUWXHRIKLVKXPDQLW\µKDV´ RQHLQQDWHULJKWµQDPHO\´ IUHHGRP
LQGHSHQGHQFH IURP EHLQJ FRQVWUDLQHG E\ DQRWKHU·V FKRLFH LQVRIDU DV LW FDQ FRH[LVW ZLWK WKH
freedom of every other in accordance witK D XQLYHUVDO ODZµ 00 . :KHQ LV RQH·V
independence FRQVWUDLQHGE\DQRWKHU·VFKRLFHLQDZD\WKDWZRXOGLQIULQJHXSRQWKLVLQQDWHULJKW"
The answer here is not a matter of the content of the maxim on which the other acts, but rather of 
the private, ´unilateralµ FKDUDFWHURIWKHRWKHU·VDFW3URSHUW\DFTXLVLWLRQLQDSUH-political state of 
nature exemplifies such an act: where one claims property in (say) a piece of land, one thereby 
unilaterally claims a right to exclude others from possessing that land, and to that extent restricts 
the innate freedom of those others.  
The personal acquisition of property is, Kant thinks, necessary in order for us to pursue 
our chosen life projects. It is then important to understand how such acquisition can occur without 
LQIULQJLQJXSRQWKHLQQDWHULJKWWRIUHHGRPRIRWKHUV.DQW·VDQVZHULVWKDW´>L@WLVSRVVLEOHWRKDYH
VRPHWKLQJ H[WHUQDO DV RQH·V RZQ RQO\ LQ D ULJKWIXO FRQGLWLRQ XQGHU DQ DXWKRULW\ JLYLQJ ODZV
SXEOLFO\WKDWLVLQDFLYLOFRQGLWLRQµ (MM 6:255). Specifically, the answer is the state. Following 
Arthur Ripstein (2009), we can say that the state solves three interrelated problems: the problem 
of unilateralism; the problem of indeterminacy; and the problem of assurance. First, the state, in 
representing the general and public will of its citizens, can overcome the problem of the unilateral 
DFTXLVLWLRQRISURSHUW\E\ZD\RI LWVSXEOLF ¶RPQLODWHUDO· determination of property rights ² it 
therefore provides the context in which private ownership is possible without infringing upon the 
independence of others. Second, the state can authoritatively settle potential problems of 
indeterminacy (where exactly, for example, does the boundary between my land and yours lie?) 
that could otherwise only be settled by the respective reassertion of unilateral wills. And third, the 
VWDWHSURYLGHVDVVXUDQFHIRU.DQW,DPQRW´XQGHUREOLJDWLRQWROHDYHH[WHUQDOREMHFWVEHORQJLQJ
to others untouched unless everyone else provides me with assurance that he will behave in 
accordDQFHZLWKWKHVDPHSULQFLSOHZLWKUHJDUGWRZKDWLVPLQHµ (MM 6: 256). Kant believes such 
assurance can only be provided by a coercive, sovereign authority. These three roles for the state 
² i.e. the solving of the problems of unilateralism, indeterminacy and assurance ² are distributed 
respectively to the legislature, the judiciary and the executive, delivering the Kantian case for a 
republican state, specifically.  
But this deals only with ¶domestic right· (i.e. conditions of external freedom between 
individuals). And while there is little interpretative controversy about the institutional solution to 
domestic Right, we have already seen that the same cannot be said about ¶international right· (i.e. 
conditions of external freedom between states). The present paper, additionally, brings 
¶cosmopolitan right· firmly into view. As it will be understood here, cosmopolitan right refers to 
conditions of external freedom between political communities (be they states, or non-state 
¶peoples·) and those private persons who arrive at the territories of such communities seeking to 
interacWZLWKWKHPZKRP,ZLOOUHIHUWRDV´YLVLWRUVµ  
In its content, cosmopolitan rLJKW LV´OLPLWHG WR WKHFRQGLWLRQVRIXQLYHUVDOKRVSLWDOLW\µ 
(Kant, PP 8: 357). As I will understand this here, such conditions of hospitality entail that (i) a 
foreign visitor has the right to visit other political communities, for the purposes of striking up 
interaction (e.g. trade, migration, and intellectual exchange) without that visit being treated as a 
hostile act, but that (ii) the receiving community has the right to refuse such interaction and turn 
the visitor away, provided that (iii) this ´can be done without GHVWUR\LQJKLPµ33.  
 Cosmopolitan rLJKWFRPSOHWHV.DQW·VFRQFHUQZLWKH[WHUQDOIUHHGRPE\ RYHUFRPLQJ´WKH
exclusion of foreigners from the fold of moral respect, while at the same time securing a space for 
nations and groups to pursue distinct ways of lifeµ (Muthu, 2000: 24). As substantiated by the 
conditions of hospitality, I here take cosmopolitan right to have at least the following two 
implications. First, it protects political communities against unwelcome approaches of outsiders 
not covered by domestic or international right: importantly, it entails that the colonial acquisition 
of foreign lands is contrary to right.iv Second, and more controversially, because it precludes 
communities turning away persons where doing so would lead to their ´destructionµI will take it 
to amount to a modest ULJKWRIDV\OXP$V3DXOLQH.OHLQJHOGKDVSXWLW.DQW´DQWLFLSDWHVPDQ\
of the refugee rights, including the principle of non-refoulment, that were established in the 
WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\µ.v The principle of non-refoulment is one that can be found in various 
documents in contemporary international law. Article 33(1) of the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, for example, states that:  
1R&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWHVKDOOH[SHORUUHWXUQ´UHIRXOHUµDUHIXJHHLQDQ\PDQQHUZKDWVRHYHUWRWKH
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (United Nations, 1951). 
In what follows in proceeding sections of this paper, my argument will focus in particular on this 
asylum aspect of cosmopolitan right.  
The understanding of cosmopolitan right I have set out here might be accused both of 
being too substantive, and of not being substantive enough. Some deny that cosmopolitan right 
amounts to a right of asylum, or indeed to anything publicly enforceable at all. For one recent 
H[DPSOH KHUH &KULVWRSKHU 0HFNVWURWK FODLPV WKDW .DQWLDQ KRVSLWDOLW\ ´IXQFWLRQV QRW DV D
freestanding positive claim demanding enforcement but as a way of ruling out specious 
justifications for war against those the traditional law of QDWLRQVSHUPLWWHGRQHWRODEHOHQHPLHVµ 
(Meckstroth, 2017: 1). Specifically, Meckstroth understands Kantian hospitality as a rejoinder to 
WKH LGHD SXW IRUZDUG E\ 9LWRULD DQG *URWLXV WKDW ´ZKHQ QRQ-state peoples reject trade with 
Europeans, they violate a sacred right of hospitality, committing an injury (injuria) or harm (laesio) 
WKDWHQWLWOHV(XURSHDQVWRYLQGLFDWHWKHLUULJKWE\IRUFHµ (Meckstroth, 2017: 14). .DQW·VSULQFLSOH
of hospitality says that although there is a right to visit, the community being visited also has the 
right to refuse interaction with the visitors; hence, such refusal does not constitute an injury to 
which conquest and plunder is a just response. Kantian hospitality, on this view, is understood to 
HQWDLO´QRHQIRUFHPHQWDWDOOµDQGKHQFHQRLQVWLWXWLRQVUDWKHULW´was framed just so that it 
FRXOGQHYHUEHLQYRNHGWRVWDUWDQHZZDULQWKHQDPHRISXUVXLQJRQH·VULJKWVMeckstroth, 2017: 
16).  
At the very outset of part II of the ¶doctrine of rLJKW·ZLWKLQWKHMetaphysics of Morals, Kant 
VWDWHVWKDWWKH´VXPRIWKHODZVZKLFKQHHGWREHSURPXOJDWHGJHQHUDOO\LQRUGHUWREULQJDERXWD
rightful condition is public rightµ (MM: 6:311). Domestic, international and cosmopolitan right are 
there explicitly presented as three distinct forms of this public rLJKW%\FRQWUDVW0HFNVWURWK·V
interpretation of cosmopolitan right invites us to conceive of it not as a form of justiciable law, but 
VLPSO\DVD¶PRUDOODZ·ZKLFKSRWHQWLDOFRORQLVHUVRXJKWWRUHFRJQLVHDQGKHHG7o understand 
cosmopolitan right in this way, however, is to ignore public rLJKW·VH[SOLFLWFRQFHUQWRUHDOLVH´ RXWHU
>LH H[WHUQDO@ IUHHGRP OLPLWHG E\ ODZµ UDWKHU WKDQ WR DUWLFXODWH WKH PRUDO PD[LPV RQ ZKLFK
persons ought to act (MM 6:311). The latter is not sufficient for the realisation of external freedom 
because, inter alia, ´before a public lawful condition is established individual human beings, 
peoples and states can never be secure against violence from one anotherµMM 6:312). Even if 
cosmopolitan right were to be limited to the precluding of colonialism, therefore, it is far from clear 
that there ought to be no enforcement, and no institutional implications.vi  
The case for so limiting the scope of cosmopolitan right is anyway debatable. Meckstroth 
PD\ EH ULJKW WKDW .DQW·V primary intention with respect to cosmopolitan right was to reject 
contemporary understandings of just war, and in particular, to preclude colonialism.vii But this 
much can be happily accepted without also needing to accept the stronger claim that cosmopolitan 
rLJKWGRHVQRWHQWDLO´DSRVLWLYHFODLPWRZHOIDUHIRUUHIXJHHVRUWRXQLPSHGHGFRPPXQLFDWLRQRU
WR DQ\WKLQJ HOVHµ (Meckstroth, 2017: 15). Admittedly, the case for reading a positive claim to 
asylum in Kant is not clear-cut. On the one hand, there is no reference to the notion that visitors 
cannot be turned away if it will lead to their destruction in discussion of cosmopolitan right in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. <HWHOVHZKHUHLQ.DQW·VZULWLQJFDQEHIRXQGWKHIROORZLQJ 
,QKRVSLWDEOHVWUHWFKHVRIWKHHDUWK·VVXUIDFHVXFKDVWKHVHDDQGWKHGHVHUWVWKDWEHORQJWRQRRQH
divide the community of human beings, but in such a way that ships in the one case and camels 
(the ships of the desert) in the other make possible a visit by one people to another. Whoever does 
this voluntarily can in any case be turned away, but not fought, by the inhabitants, whoever is 
involuntarily forced into it (a ship that seeks haven in a storm or the crew of a stranded ship) cannot 
be again chased into driving danger from the coast or the oasis in which he saved himself, still less 
can he be captured, but he must be able to find shelter until a suitable opportunity for his departure 
arises (DPP: 23:173).  
$GPLWWHGO\ WKLV H[SOLFLW UHIHUHQFH WR RIIHULQJ ´KDYHQµ RQO\ DSSHDUV LQ WKH GUDIWV RI Toward 
Perpetual Peace. Nevertheless, the final text ² UHIHUULQJDV LWGRHVWRWKH´LQKRVSLWDEOHQHVVRI WKH
LQKDELWDQWVRIVHDFRDVWV«HQVODYLQJVWUDQGHGVHDIDUHUVµ33² can reasonably be taken to 
be alluding to the same idea.  
 It might be argued that this example hardly adds up to an anticipation of twentieth-century 
UHIXJHHULJKWV$IWHUDOOWKH¶VDYHKDYHQ·H[DPSOHLVSDUWLFXODr in form: there is no mention of a 
duty to provide refuge to visitors suffering political persecution elsewhere, for instance, but only 
WRWKHOLWHUDODQGLPPHGLDWHRIIHULQJRIKDUERXUWRWKRVHDWDVWDWH·VWHUULWRU\ZKRZRXOGRWKHUZLVH
perish. Taken strictly, therefore, Kantian cosmopolitan right cannot be invoked to (for example) 
claim an obligation for states to accept asylum seekers who are currently in refugee camps in 
DQRWKHUWHUULWRU\1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHORJLFRI.DQW·VDUJXPHQWVHHPVH[WHQGDEOHEH\Rnd the specific 
example of sailors in peril that he gives. It seems to imply, for instance, that if asylum seekers reach 
the territory of another state, and having done so have a convincing case that their life would ² for 
whatever reason ² be in peril were they to be turned away again, then the receiving state has an 
REOLJDWLRQWRRIIHUWKHPUHIXJHXQWLOVXFKWLPHXQWLOWKHWKUHDWRI¶GHVWUXFWLRQ·KDVSDVVHG 
I therefore agree with Kleingeld that ´LW LV UHasonable to read [cosmopolitan right] as 
entailing UHIXJHHULJKWVµ ² at least, some refugee rights, even if in a narrower set than 
those characterising modern-day refugee practice. To consider this to be reasonable is not to claim 
to have settled the matter definitively ² and for those who remain unconvinced, the argument that 
unfolds in the proceeding sections of this paper can be understood conditionally. 
A criticism of my understanding of cosmopolitan right may also come from an opposite 
direction, however. It might be claimed that cosmopolitan rLJKW LVQ·W FRQVWUDLQHG WR UHODWLRQV
between political communities and individual visitors, but also encompasses relations between 
individuals across borders (Niesen, 2007: 91; Flikschuh, 2000: 151). Some theorists also want to 
extract from (or put into) cosmopolitan right a wider range of rights, such as those contained within 
contemporary human rights discourse (Eleftheriadis, 2003). My line of argument in this paper does 
not depend upon these more ambitious interpretations of cosmopolitan right; but nor does it 
depend upon their rejection. I therefore remain agnostic about such interpretations. For my 
argument to go through, I require only that cosmopolitan right includes the limited right to asylum 
I have suggested here.     
 
7KHDUJXPHQWIURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\ 
For some, the institutional implications of international right follow by simple analogy with 
domestic right. Just as individual persons must leave an anarchic state of nature and enter a 
republican state, so states themselves must leave the international state of nature and enter under 
the coercive authority of a federal world government. Support for this simple analogy can indeed 
EHIRXQGLQSODFHVLQDFURVV.DQW·VZULWLQJVVXFKDVZKHQLWLVFODLPHGWKDWLWLs through a union 
´DQDORJRXVWRWKHXQLRQWKURXJKZKLFKDSHRSOHEHFRPHVDVWDWHµWKDWVWDWHVFDQUHDOLVHFRQGLWLRQV
of public Right between themselves (MM 6: 350). Across this section and the next, I consider what 
I take to be the two most prominent normative rejections of the idea that international right can 
entail a world government, which call into question differing aspects of the simple analogy. Each 
of the two forms of argument appeals, in a different way, to the notion of the state as a particular 
kind of person.  
  7KHILUVWVXFKDUJXPHQWLVRQHWKDWDSSHDOVWRVWDWHV·GLVWLQFWLYHPRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\and is 
articulated most extensively by Katrin Flikschuh (2010).viii This argument runs as follows. Like 
individual persons, states possess moral personality: they have a will, from which it follows that 
WKH\ FDQ EH KHOG PRUDOO\ UHVSRQVLEOH DQG ZKLFK WKHUHIRUH DOORZV WKHP WR EH ´DSSUDLVHG DV
individuals, who in their natural condition (that is, in their independence from external laws) 
DOUHDG\ ZURQJ RQH DQRWKHUµ E\ UHPDLQLQJ LQ VXFK D FRQGLWLRQ (PP 8:354). However, while 
individuals and states are both moral agents, with resultant moral obligations to leave their 
respectivHVWDWHVRIQDWXUH´WKH\DUHQRWWRNHQVRIWKHVDPHW\SH7KHFUXFLDOGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ
WKHPLVWKDW LQGLYLGXDOV·ZLOOVDUH MXULGLFDOO\QRQ-VRYHUHLJQZKHUHDVVWDWHV·ZLOOVDUH MXULGLFDOO\
VRYHUHLJQµ (Flikschuh, 2010: 480)6WDWHV·ZLOOVEHFDXVHWKH\DUe sovereign and general, provide 
the institutional solution to the matter of domestic rLJKW%XWSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHVWDWHV·ZLOOVKDYH
this sovereign character, they cannot be compelled to enter into an equivalent sovereign body at 
the global level, since tRFRPSHOWKHPWRGRVR´ ZRXOGDPRXQWWRDGHQLDORIWKHLUGLVWLQFWLYHPRUDO
VWDWXVDVEHORQJLQJ WR WKDW W\SHRIPRUDODJHQWZKRVHZLOO LV MXULGLFDOO\VRYHUHLJQµ (Flikschuh, 
2010: 480). Indeed, not only can states not be forcibly compelled into a global sovereign, they 
ought not voluntarily to enter into one either, since this would still amount to the alienation of 
VWDWHV·GLVWLQFWLYHPRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\ 
  6WDWHV· MXULGLFDO VRYHUHLJQW\GRHVQRWPHDQ WKH\FDQDYRLd obligations of international 
right, however ² indeed, the opposite is the case:  
insofar as we accept that as a predicate of their distinctive moral personality states ought not to (be 
PDGHWRJLYHXSWKHLUVRYHUHLJQW\VWDWHV·IDLOXUHLQWXUQWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHREOLJDWLRQVWKDWDWWDFK
to their moral personality would be equally unacceptable. A moral agent who fails to acknowledge 
the obligations that attach to their moral status fails to treat himself as moral agent (Flikschuh, 2010: 
480).  
Hence, even if states cannot be externally compelled to meet their obligations, they are nevertheless 
morally compelled to self-legislate in order to realise those obligations, by way of their participation 
in and cooperation with a free league of nations.ix Hence international right UHPDLQV¶HQIRUFHDEOH·
even if not externally enforceable.  
 This kind of argument is bolstered by the claim that states have, or can progressively 
develop, the capacity reliably to self-legislate their duties of international right. As Patrick Capps 
DQG-XOLDQ5LYHUVSXWLW´8QOLNHKXPDQQDWXUHZKLFKLVIODZHGWKHQDWXUHRIVWDWHVLVIRU.DQW
UHIRUPDEOHDQGLWLVWKLVSRLQWWKDWKROGVWKHNH\WRWKHYLDELOLW\RIDFRQIHGHUDWLRQµ (2010: 245). 
In this vein cosmopolitan thinkers sympathetic to Kant have appealed variously in their work to 
WKH SURVSHFW RU SRVVLELOLW\ RI ¶UHVSRQVLEOH FRVPRSROLWDQ VWDWHV· (Brown, 2011) ¶VWDWLVW
FRVPRSROLWDQLVP· (Ypi, 2011) FRVPRSROLWDQ ¶GHPRFUDWLF LWHUDWLRQV· ZLWKLQ VWDWHV (Benhabib, 
2006), and FRVPRSROLWDQ¶OHDUQLQJSURFHVVHV· (Habermas, 2006). Such notions support the idea 
that states are able to come to autonomously recognise and act upon the demands of international 
Right, absent sovereign power above them.x  
 Cosmopolitan right, however, has self-confessedly not been the focus of the argument from 
VWDWHV· PRUDO SHUVRQDOLW\ :KLOH Flikschuh is keenly aware of the systematic and interlocking 
QDWXUH RI .DQW·V GRFWULQH RI ULJKW VKH LV QHYHUWKHOHVV H[SOLFLW WKDW KHU ´IRFXV ZLOO EH RQ WKH
transition from domestic to international RLJKWµ (2010: 476). Let us assume that the argument 
IURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\VXFFHHGVDVDUHDVRQIRUUHMHFWLQJDZRUOGJRYHUQPHQWZKHQWKH
focus is so constrained. What happens when we expand the focus to include cosmopolitan right? 
 Recall that in the domain of cosmopolitan right, the relevant interactions are not between 
state and state, but rather between state (or other political community) and visitors to that state.xi 
This third, cosmopolitan context of interaction amounts to a third state of nature: it is a third 
FRQWH[WLQZKLFKDJHQWVSRVVHVVWKHFDSDFLW\WRLQIULQJHXSRQHDFKRWKHU·VLQQDWHULJKWWRIUHHGRP
by way of their unilateral wills (domestic and international right do not themselves overcome the 
lawless nature of interaction between states and visitors). Now, it is a premise of the argument 
IURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\WKDWVWDWHVSRVVHVVVRPHWKLQJ² i.e. juridical sovereignty ² that other 
kinds of moral agent do not possess. Therefore, rather than a context in which all parties are 
juridical sovereigns (as in the international context), we now, at the cosmopolitan level, enter a 
context in which it may be the case that one party (i.e. a state) is a juridical sovereign and the other 
party (i.e. the individual visitor) is not. Since the individual visitor is not juridically sovereign, it 
VHHPVWKDWWKHDUJXPHQWIURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\PXVWVD\² by analogy with individuals in 
the domestic case ² that the visitor must enter into the jurisdiction of a global sovereign that can 
represent the global public will, resolve indeterminacy, and provide assurance regarding matters 
of cosmopolitan right, while also maintaining that states must not enter into any such global 
sovereign. 
Let me illustrate the challenge this presents with reference to the asylum aspect of 
cosmopolitan right in particular. A visitor arrives in the territory of a state and requests asylum ² 
per the principle of hospitality, the receiving state ought only to refuse asylum if doing so will not 
lead to the destruction of the asylum applicant. But this in itself is only an abstract moral principle, 
not a legal determination ² and it is the latter that right requires. Suppose the receiving state 
believes that it can indeed reject the asylum application without it leading to the destruction of the 
DSSOLFDQW WKLV LVSUHFLVHO\ WKHDVVXPSWLRQRI ¶VDIHFRXQWU\RIRULJLQ· OLVWVGUDZQXSE\YDULRXV
European states today, for instance).xii In contrast, the applicant reaffirms that they believe they 
will face their destruction if the application is refused; that, they say, is why they are seeking asylum 
in the first place. Both parties here are interpreting the general principle of hospitality in the way 
that seems right to them; in other words, they both express their private, unilateral will. But what 
is required is a general, public will. 
Can the confederal league of nations help here? I do not believe so. A confederal league is 
insufficient, first of all, because the visitor, as an individual person rather than a formal 
representative of another state, is not represented within the league at all ² they are thus excluded 
from any purported public will which, with respect to cosmopolitan right, is therefore in fact 
merely the unilateral, private will of states considered as a collective. One might argue in response 
that such individuals can be considered indirect co-authors of a global public will on account of 
their respective state citizenships. Kleingeld takes this view, for example, stating that ´ LQDUHSXEOLF
those who determine the laws that are to enact cosmopolitan right are representatives who are 
elected by and accountable to their constituents. Thus, individual citizens can at the same be 
conceived as world citizens who co-legislate indirHFWO\µ (2012: 90). But not only is this a rather 
sanguine view of the influence of individual citizens on state foreign policy (cf. Dahl, 1999), it also, 
more problematically, overlooks the fact that those likely to be in the most need of asylum ² 
QDPHO\´ VWDWHOHVVSHUVRQVµ² by definition cannot be incorporated as indirect legislators of the laws 
of cosmopolitan right in this way.  
One might claim that in the ideal league, no persons would be rendered stateless. But this 
cannot be a satisfactory response. It will always remain possible that disasters, human or natural, 
befall states such that all or some of their citizens become stateless and in need of asylum. The 
possibility of such events cannot be credibly idealised away, and since it cannot, all individuals, in 
a free league, remain potentially dependent upon a league of states within which their own will is 
not represented.xiii Individuals abstracted from states, as the agents for whom matters of asylum are 
particularly pertinent, are not appropriately represented as part of a global public will from within 
a confederal league ² and since they are not, their external freedom remains to be finally secured.  
Perhaps though, the idea of a confederal league can be tinkered with in a way that both 
respects the juridical sovereignty of states and recognises the need for individuals to be represented 
within a cosmopolitan public will. Such might be thought to be the aspiration of modern theorists 
ZKRKDYHRIIHUHGYDULRXVPRGHOVRI´ FRVPRSROLWDQGHPRFUDF\µ,QVRPH of these models, a global 
parliament comprising two chambers is hypothesised: the existing UN assembly, suitably 
reformed, acts as the first chamber in which states are represented; and a second chamber is added 
in which individuals worldwide are represented.xiv Such a global parliament might produce laws 
regarding asylum and other aspects of cosmopolitan right that a global judiciary and other agencies 
FRXOGLQWHUSUHWLQVSHFLILFFDVHVGHWHUPLQLQJIRUH[DPSOHZKHWKHUDSDUWLFXODUFRXQWU\ZDVD¶VDIH
counWU\RIRULJLQ· IRU D VSHFLILF DV\OXPDSSOLFDQW LQ D VSHFLILF LQVWDQFH:KHUH LWZDV IXUWKHU
stipulated that representation in such a parliament, and subjection to the jurisdiction of such a 
court, should be legally voluntary in the case of states but mandatory in the case of individuals, 
would this not sufficiently respond the differentiated moral personalities at play?  
 Such an amendment to the idea of a league of nations cannot, in my view, succeed as a 
Kantian DPHQGPHQWEHFDXVHVRORQJDVVWDWHV·PHPEHUVKLSUHPDLQVYROXQWDU\WKHUHIDLOVSURSHUO\
to be realised the reciprocity which is inherent in the idea of external freedom. As Kant puts it, the 
LGHDRIWKHLQQDWHULJKWWRIUHHGRP´DOUHDG\LQYROYHV«LQQDWHequality, that is, independence from 
EHLQJERXQGE\RWKHUVWRPRUHWKDQRQHFDQLQWXUQELQGWKHPµ (MM: 6:237). The institutional 
form presently under consideration would deny individual visitors this independence: states would 
be able to participate in definitively binding individuals to law, while retaining the possibility of 
avoiding being bound in turn. Consider what this means in practice: where asylum seekers appeal 
to a global court against the rejection of their asylum application by a receiving state, citing their 
likely destruction were they to be expelled, and win a judgement in their favour, the receiving state 
in question would in practice be legally entitled to withdraw from the league, ignore the judgement, 
and expel the applicant anyway.  
Of coXUVHWKHDUJXPHQWIURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\VD\VWKDWVWDWHVFDQQRWmorally do 
this ² instead they ought, as a corollary of their appeal to their unique moral personality, to 
recognise their obligations in the domain of cosmopolitan right. Yet practically, they would be 
entitled to do as they please. And there is no equivalent legal entitlement for individuals: 
cosmopolitan right institutionalised in this way affords asylum applicants no legal right to 
withdraw themselves from jurisdiction of the league and to continue to do what seems right to 
them instead by, for instance, simply entering the territory of the receiving state surreptitiously and 
evading domestic authorities. This lack of legal reciprocity between subjects of cosmopolitan right 
undermines the idea that an amended free league could represent the institutional conditions of 
H[WHUQDOIUHHGRPVLQFHLQGLYLGXDOVDUHQRWDVVXUHGRI´WKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRIEHLQJERXQGE\RWKHUV
WRQRPRUHWKDQRQHFDQLQWXUQELQGWKHPµ (MM: 6: 237).  
When the focus is on international rLJKWWKHDUJXPHQWIURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\PLJKW
be able to explain why states cannot be subjected to a global sovereign. But this is not sufficient to 
settle the institutional question, because it leaves unexplained how it can rightly be the case that 
states cannot be subjected to a global sovereign and yet individual visitors, as juridical non-
VRYHUHLJQVPXVWEH7KHDSSHDO WRVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\RIIHUVQRUHDVRQIRU LQGLYLGXDOVWR
accept this legal inequality, even LILWRIIHUVDUHDVRQIRUVWDWHVPXWXDOO\WRUHFRJQLVHHDFKRWKHU·V
juridical sovereignty in the international context. We are seemingly at an impasse.  
)OLNVFKXK SUHVHQWV WKH DUJXPHQW IURP VWDWHV· PRUDO SHUVRQDOLW\ DV SDUW RI D ´V\VWHPLF
VROXWLRQµ WRD´VRYHUHLJQW\GLOHPPDµ IRU.DQW (2010: 490). The dilemma, which arises in the 
international context, is that Kant is committed both to the inherently enforceable nature of right, 
and to the juridical sovereignty of states. The proposed solution, as we have seen, is to emphasise 
WKDWDVDFRUROODU\RIVWDWHV·GLVWLQFWLYHPRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\VWDWHVDUHREOLJHGWRVHOI-enforce their 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQVDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHIUHHOHDJXH7KLVVROXWLRQLV´V\VWHPLFµEHFDXVHWKH
institutional implications and possibilities for international right are considered in light of the 
institutional demands of domestic right, rather than merely by way of analogy with the latter. But 
ZKDW,KDYHDUJXHGKHUHLQHIIHFWLVWKDWWKHDUJXPHQWIURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\LVQ·WV\VWHPLF
enough: it proposes an institutional solution for international right in light of domestic right, but 
LWGRHVQ·WORRNWKHRWKHUZD\DQGVLPLODUO\FRQVLGHUWKHSURVSHFWVIRUcosmopolitan right in light 
of this supposed solution. When we do so, we seem to be led to replace one dilemma with another: 
instead of the clash between the inKHUHQWO\ HQIRUFHDEOH QDWXUH RI ULJKW DQG VWDWHV· juridical 
VRYHUHLJQW\ ZH KDYH WKH FODVK EHWZHHQ VWDWHV· MXULGLFDO VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG WKH LGHD RI HTXDOLW\
inherent in the innate right to freedom. 
7KH V\VWHPLF VROXWLRQ RIIHUHG E\ WKH DUJXPHQW IURP VWDWHV· PRUDO SHUVRQDOLW\ LV WKXV
incomplete. What might a fuller systemic solution to the institutional question look like, one that 
took account not just of the interaction between domestic and international right, but also of 
cosmopolitan right? I cannot pursue this question at any length here, but one possibility is that it 
is actually world government that is best placed to provide such a solution. A sovereign, federal 
world government within which all subjects of cosmopolitan right (i.e. states and individuals) were 
represented could preserve equality between them, consistent with their innate right to freedom. 
A federal world government that administered only cosmopolitan right (and not international right, 
which could still be administered confederally between states) would impinge upon no more of 
VWDWHV·MXULGLFDOVRYHUHLJQW\WKDQZDVQHFHVVDU\LQRUGer to account for cosmopolitan right. Given 
that this solution would iQYROYHDSDUWLDO UHVWULFWLRQRIVWDWHV· MXULGLFDOVRYHUHLJQW\ LWPLJKWEH
WKRXJKWWREHRQO\EHDSDUWLDOVROXWLRQ $´SDUWLDOVROXWLRQµKRZHYHU LVDOVRKRZ)OLNVFKXK
GHVFULEHVWKHDUJXPHQWIURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\LWVHOIDVDUHVSRQVHWRWKHRULginal sovereignty 
dilemma (2010: 472). Such partial solutions are perhaps intrinsic to a systemic approach to the 
institutionalisation of public right.  
 
States· physical personhood: the argument from restricted competence 
 Let us now consider the second argument for a league of nations as the answer to the institutional 
question, again developed with particular focus on international right, and see if it can be sustained 
when cosmopolitan right is brought into view.  
We can call this second argument the argument from restricted competence, and it runs as 
follows. Unlike domestic right, international right does not require institutionalisation in the form 
of a (world) republic because international right must achieve comparatively fewer things. To 
recall, at the level of domestic right, there are three discrete problems at hand: the problem of 
unilateralism; the problem of indeterminacy; and the problem of assurance. By contrast, according 
to the argument from restricted competence, at the level of international right there exists only one 
of these problems, namely the problem of indeterminacy. This claim relies on our accepting that 
´.DQW·VGLVFXVVLRQRIFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQVWDWHVWXUQVHQWLUHO\RQWKHULJKWWRHQJDJHLQGHIHQVLYHZDUµ 
(Ripstein, 2009: 227). Assuming international right is confined to this issue, the problem of 
indeterminacy persists because there can be good faith disagreements between states about who is 
acting aggressively and who is acting in self-defence which need to be impartially resolved. But 
there are no problems of unilateralism or assurance because (i) states are not the sorts of entities 
WKDWDFTXLUHSURSHUW\XQLODWHUDOO\RURWKHUZLVHDQGLLVLQFHWKH\GRQ·WDFTXLUHDQ\WKLQJWKHUHLV
no problem of assurance of acquisition to be settled. Therefore, international right has no need of 
a legislature, nor of an executive, since those agencies are institutional responses to the respective 
(and in this context non-existent) problems of unilateralism and assurance. All that is required is 
a judiciary, as a response to the indeterminacy problem.  
 7KHQRWLRQWKDWVWDWHVGRQ·WDFTXLUHSURSHUW\PLJKWVWULNHWKHUHDGHUDVDVWUDQJHQRWLRQ
given that states claim and defend territories, which we might intuitively think of as equivalent to 
property claims. But in the argument from restricted competence, it is supposed that  
[t]he state does not acquire its territory; its territory is just the spatial manifestation of the state « 
The state is always necessarily in possession of its territory, just as a person is always in possession 
of his or her body (Ripstein, 2009: 228). 
And so while individuals acquire external objects in order to further their private ends, a state does 
no such thing. A VWDWH·VWHUULWRU\is constitutive of its personhood, not an external possession.   
 A further qualification is required, because it might be thought that even if a global 
judiciary is all that international Right requires, such a judiciary ought still to be sovereign in its 
decision-making, meaning that it would still be possible to speak of the need for an ultra-minimal 
world government, rather than a free league. To avoid this conclusion, a further claim is made: 
the judiciary must not be sovereign, because for it to be sovereign would be to open up the 
SRVVLELOLW\WKDWDVWDWHEHIRUFHGWRZDULQRUGHUWRGHIHQGDQRWKHUVWDWHZKHUHDV´QRRWKHUVWDWH
KDVDQHQIRUFHDEOHULJKWWKDWRWKHUVSXWWKHPVHOYHVLQGDQJHUWRGHIHQGLWµ (Ripstein, 2009: 230). 
 I take there to be two problems with the argument from restricted competence so described. 
The first problem is the central claim of restricted competence itself: a consideration of 
cosmopolitan right can render this problem clear, and I turn to this task imminently. The second 
problem is that there is no reason to suppose that a sovereign judiciary need lead to states being 
obligated to go to war on behalf of others. A global judiciary can make sovereign judgements 
without those judgements needing to involve the ordering of state X to defend state Y against state 
Z; it is no conceptually necessary part of resolving a case of indeterminacy regarding two opposing 
claims of self-defence that the court must compel a third party to enforce its judgement. Now, it 
might be claimed that without a method of enforcement, a judiciary evidences no practical 
sovereignty worthy of the name. But even if that is true, there is no good reason why third-party 
states must be that method, rather than a global executive ² indeed, the idea that states would be 
obligated to go to war in defence of others seems to arise only because the initial claim of restricted 
competence itself renders a global executive unavailable.  
 What then of that claim? I want to grant that the argument from restricted competence 
might succeed when considering international right in abstraction but argue that it cannot sustain 
when bringing cosmopolitan right into view. Moreover, when cosmopolitan right is indeed 
brought into view, the argument from restricted competence points instead toward a world 
government as the answer to the institutional question.xv    
 7KH LQLWLDO DUJXPHQW IURP UHVWULFWHG FRPSHWHQFH UHVWV XSRQ WKH QRWLRQ WKDW VWDWHV·
WHUULWRULHVDUHPRUDOO\DQDORJRXVWRSHUVRQV·ERGLHV,IVXFKDQHTXLYDOHQFHSHUWDLQVWKHQit follows 
that  
$Q\RQHZKRHQWHUVLWV>LHDVWDWH·V@WHUULWRU\ZLWKRXWLWVDXWKRUL]DWLRQHQWHUVWKHVWDWHLWVHOIVKRXOG
such a person overstay his welcome, he commits a wrong analogous to battery, rather than one 
analogous to theft (Ripstein, 2009: 228).  
,QLQIULQJLQJXSRQWKHERGLO\LQWHJULW\RIWKHVWDWHRQHLQIULQJHVXSRQWKHVWDWH·VLQQDWHULJKWWR
IUHHGRPE\DQDORJ\ZLWKSHUVRQV·LQQDWHULJKWWRERGLO\IUHHGRPLQWKHLQGLYLGXDOFDVH%RGLHV
are entitled to occupy space; that another may wish to occupy that same space, and yet now 
FDQQRWLVQRWDQXQGXHUHVWULFWLRQRIWKHRWKHU·VIUHHGRPEXWLVLQVWHDGRQO\DQLQVWDQFHRIWKH
way in which, by occupying space, one agent can legitimately affect the context of the freedom of 
choice of another. OccuS\LQJVSDFHLVQRWDUHVWULFWLRQRIDQRWKHU·VIUHHGRP whereas interfering 
with a body that already occupies that space is7KHUHIRUH´,I,LQYDGHWKHVSDFH\RXRFFXS\\RX
FDQSXVKPHDZD\µDVD¶KLQGUDQFHWRDKLQGUDQFHWRIUHHGRP· (Ripstein, 2009: 378).  
By analogy, it should follow that if someone, without authorisation, enters the space a state 
RFFXSLHVWKDWVWDWHFDQ¶SXVKDZD\·WKH¶LQYDGHU·WRR<HWWKHTXHVWLRQDULVHVDVWRKRZDQ\VXFK
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI VWDWHV· WHUULWRULHV FDQ EH UHQGHUHG FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK WKH DV\OXP DVSHFW of 
cosmopolitan right. This aspect, in setting out the circumstances in which states cannot turn visitors 
DZD\IURPWKHLUWHUULWRULHVLQHIIHFWLIZHDFFHSWWKHDQDORJ\ZLWKSHUVRQV·ERGLHVGHOLQHDWHVWKH
circumstances in which a state, which may wish to expel the visitor, must nevertheless accept 
¶EDWWHU\·%XWWRVD\Whis would be to strike at the very heart of the idea of an innate right to freedom, 
ZKLFKLVLWVHOIWKHIRXQGDWLRQDOQRWLRQRI.DQW·V doctrine of rLJKW,IVWDWHV·WHUULWRULHVUHDOO\ZHUH
PRUDOO\DNLQWRSHUVRQV·ERGLHVIRU.DQWWKHQKHZRXOGKDYHWRKDYH said that a state, in repelling 
DV\OXPVHHNHUVQHYHULQIULQJHVXSRQWKHODWWHU·VIUHHGRPEXWPHUHO\DGYHUVHO\FKDQJHVWKRVH
DV\OXP VHHNHUV· FRQWH[W RI IUHHGRP RI FKRLFH E\ RFFXS\LQJ VSDFH WKDW ZRXOG RWKHUZLVH EH
available as refuge.  
That Kant does not say this, and also cannot credibly be understood as legislating for 
EDWWHU\VKRXOGOHDGXVWRFRQFOXGHWKDWVWDWHV·WHUULWRULHVLQIDFWGLIIHUIURPSHUVRQV·ERGLHVLQD
morally relevant way. Yet it is also true that for Kant, property represents external means by which 
agents pursue private ends, and since states, as public entities, ought not to have SULYDWHHQGVLW·V
QRW DW DOO REYLRXV WKDW VWDWHV· WHUULWRULHV VKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRG IURPD.DQWLDQSHUVSHFWLYH DV
property (Mikalsen, 2011: 312)7KHZD\IRUZDUGKHUH,EHOLHYHLVWRHPSKDVLVHVWDWHV·GLVWLQFWLYH
kind RIHPERGLPHQW,IVWDWHV·WHUULWRULHVDUHDQDORJRXVWRSHUVRQV·ERGLHVLQRQHUHVSHFWQDPHO\
WKDWWKH\FDQHDFKEHGHVFULEHGDVWKH¶VSDWLDOPDQLIHVWDWLRQ·RIWKHLUUHVSHFtive subjects), they are 
DOVRGLVDQDRORJRXV LQDW OHDVW WKH IROORZLQJ WZRZD\V)LUVW VWDWHV· WHUULWRULHVXQOLNHSHUVRQV·
ERGLHVDUHFRQWLQJHQW,WLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WKDWDVWDWH·VWHUULWRU\WDNHVWKHVSHFLILFIRUPWKDWLWGRHV
$SHUVRQ·VERG\E\FRQWUast, is importantly physically determinate (on account, for example, of 
RQH·VJHQHWLFPDNHXS:HFRXOGQRWEHDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQWKHERGLHVWKDWZHDUHxvi; and without 
certain of our body parts, we will not be at all. By contrast, while some area of territory is necessary 
to the very existence of a state, there is no particular patch of territory that for any one state must 
be part of its physical manifestation.xvii  
6HFRQGVWDWHV·ERGLHVXQOLNHSHUVRQV·ERGLHVDUHDUWLILFLDO7KH\DUHDWURRWDQLPDJLQDWLYe 
DFWMXVWDVLVLQGHHG¶WKHVWDWH·LWVHOI,WLVSRVVLEOHWRTXLWWKLVLPDJLQDWLYHDFWDQGWRFRQFHLYHRI
WKHODQGWKDWPDNHVXSDVWDWH·VERG\DVVLPSO\ODQG7RSXWLWDQRWKHUZD\¶VWDWHERG\·DQG
¶SDWFKRIODQG·DUHGLIIHULQJVHQVHVRIWKHVDPHreferent (Frege, 1948). We switch between these 
senses depending on the context: someone discussing international relations may find the former 
sense pertinent; an archaeologist, by contrast, will be unlikely to. For the latter, the idea of this 
patch of land as the body of the state is not useful or important; that sense of the referent, therefore, 
GURSVDZD\HQWLUHO\LQVXFKDFRQWH[W,WLVRIFRXUVHHTXDOO\SRVVLEOHWRFRQFHLYHRIDSHUVRQ·V
body in a different sense: as physical matter, for instance. For a surgeon performing a complex 
operation, this may well be the most useful sense. But the surgeon never lets the sense that this is 
also VRPHRQH·VERG\GURSIURPYLHZHQWLUHO\VLQFHWKDWVHQVHUHPDLQVFOHDUO\LPSRUWDQW1RU,
suggest, does (or ought) DQ\RQHHOVHZKRPD\DWWLPHVKDYHFDXVHWRWKLQNRIVRPHRQH·VERG\
primarily in terms of physical matter.  
 7KHUHOHYDQFHRIVWDWHV·FRQWLQJHQWDQGDUWLILFLDOHPERGLPHQWWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQ
becomes clear once we move beyond international right to focus on cosmopolitan right. The 
HVVHQWLDOFRQWLQJHQF\RIVWDWHV·HPERGLPHQWPDNHVLWFRQFHSWXDOO\DQGSUDFWLFDOO\PHDQLQJIXOWR
DVNZKHWKHUWKHUHDUHUHDVRQVWRUHVLVWVWDWHV·H[FOXVLRQDU\FODLPWRWKHLUWHUULWRULHV,QWKHDV\OXP
aspect of cosmopolitan right Kant anticipates such a reason, by way of two claims: all human 
EHLQJVKDYLQJ´DULJKWWREHZKHUHYHUQDWXUHRUFKDQFHDSDUWIURPWKHLUZLOOKDVSODFHGWKHPµ 
(MM 6: 262)DQGWKHLUKDYLQJRULJLQDO´SRVVHVVLRQLQFRPPRQRIWKHHDUWK·VVXUIDFHµ (PP 8: 358). 
7KHUHODWLRQRIWKHIRUPHUWKH¶ULJKWWREHVRPHZKHUH·WRWKHODWWHU¶FRPPRQSRVVHVVLRQ·RIWKH
earth) admits of differing interpretations: for some, Kant proceeds from the right to be somewhere 
to the idea of common possession (e.g. Flikschuh, 2000); for others, it is the notion of common 
possession of the earth which grounds the right to be somewhere (e.g. Pinheiro Walla, 2016). 
Whichever it may be, that there does for Kant exist a right to be somewhere is of significance for 
our present purposes: it means that when an asylum seeker presents themselves at the border of 
VWDWHWKHVWDWH·VFRQWLQJHQWHPERGLPHQWUXQVXSDJDLQVWWKHQHFHVVDU\HPERGLPHQWRIWKHDV\OXP
seeker, who makes a claim to entry by way appeal to this right.   
Where such a claim is determined to have merit under cosmopolitan right, what has 
happened? On the side of the asylum applicant there has been a successful possessive claim, a 
claim of the right to be ZLWKLQWKHVWDWH·VWHUULWRU\%XWZKDWDERXWRQWKHSDUWRIWKHVWDWH"+ere 
WKHDUWLILFLDOQDWXUHRIWKHVWDWH·VHPERGLPHQWLVLPSRUWDQWLQP\YLHZWKHRQO\ZD\WRUDWLRQDOLVH
ZKDWKDVKDSSHQHGLVWROHWWKHVHQVH¶WHUULWRU\DVVWDWHERG\·GURSDZD\HQWLUHO\DQGLQVWHDGWDNH
XS D PRUH LQGLYLGXDOLVWLF VHQVH QDPHO\ ¶WHUULWRU\DV FODLPHG SRVVHVVLRQ RI WKH VWDWH·V H[LVWLQJ
FLWL]HQV·)URPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHWKHH[FOXVLRQDU\SRVVHVVLYHFODLPWRWKHVWDWH·VWHUULWRU\PDGHE\
the existing citizens ² which we now can understand as a property claim, since individual persons 
do make property claims over land ² is successfully challenged by the rival possessive claim (i.e. 
WKHULJKWWREHVRPHZKHUHZLWKLQWKHVWDWH·VWHUULWRU\RIWKHYLVLWRUxviii  
Refusing to switch to this individualistic sense of state territory with respect to 
cosmopolitan right, and instead continuing to conceive of the state as a singular, embodied person, 
necessitates absurd conceptual gymnastics. One such feat would be to say that when an asylum 
seeker makes a successful possessive claim to enter the state, a part of that body then ceases to be 
SDUWRIWKHVWDWH·VHPERGLPHQWIRUWKHOHQJWKRIWLPHWKHDV\OXPVHHNHUUHPDLQVLQWKHVWDWH%XW
which piece of land? The piece that the visitor occupies at any one time? This implies, bizarrely, 
that the body of the state is constantly morphing from one shape to another as refugees move 
about. Moreover, the pieces of land that refugees occupy do not cease to be under the jurisdiction 
of the state ² and presumably, however we conceive of the body (territory) of the state, we will 
want to understand it as co-extensive with its legal jurisdiction.  
$QDOWHUQDWLYHFRQFHSWXDOFRQWRUWLRQLVWRDWWHPSWWRFRQFHLYHRIWKHVWDWH·VWHUULWRU\both 
as its embodiment and simply as land that the refugee claims on grounds of the right to be 
somewhere. I said previously that a surgeon, when performing an operation, may have two senses 
of the same reIHUHQWLQYLHZ¶SHUVRQ·VERG\· DQG¶SK\VLFDOPDWWHU·7KHVHWZRVHQVHVKRZHYHUDUH
QRWLQH[SOLFLWWHQVLRQZLWKHDFKRWKHUDSHUVRQ·VERG\ is physical matter. By contrast, the two 
VHQVHV¶ERG\·DQG¶ODQGRYHUZKLFKDULJKWIXOSRVVHVVLYHFODLPFDQEHPDGHE\VRPHRQHHOVH·DUH
IURPD.DQWLDQSHUVSHFWLYHLQQHFHVVDU\WHQVLRQZLWKHDFKRWKHURQH·VFRQWURORYHURQH·VRZQ
body is at the heart of the innate right to freedom, and yet the latter sense implies the infringement 
RIVXFKFRQWURO%RWKVHQVHVRIWKHODQGWKDWPDNHVXSVWDWHV·WHUULWRULHVFDQQRWEHNHSWLQYLHZDW
the same time without contradiction.  
I suggest then that the imaginative fiction of the state having a body cannot hold at the 
level of cosmopolitan right. We must disassemble the artificial person in order to be able coherently 
to represent cosmopolitan political activity. When international right is considered in abstraction, 
we mLJKWEHDEOHWRFRQFHLYHRIVWDWHV·WHUULWRULHVDVFRQWLQJHQWDUWLILFLDOERGLHVDQGZHWKHUHIRUH
might be able to accept the claim of international rLJKW·V UHVWULFWHGFRPSHWHQFH%XW WKLV LVQRW
enough to resolve the institutional question in favour of a league of nations. If cosmopolitan right 
QHFHVVLWDWHV FHDVLQJ WR FRQFHLYH RI VWDWHV· WHUULWRULHV DV VWDWHV· ERGLHV DQG FRQFHLYLQJ RI WKHP
LQVWHDGDVWKHSURSHUW\H[FOXVLYHO\FODLPHGE\WKHVWDWHV·FLWL]HQVFODLPVSRWHQWLDOO\FKDOOHQJHGE\
a particular class of visitor), then, as with domestic right (even if not with international right), the 
¶SUREOHPRIXQLODWHUDOLVP·ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHDFTXLVLWLRQRISURSHUW\LVDJDLQDOLYHLVVXHLIDVWDWH·V
citizens want to vindicate the acquisition of their statH·VWHUULWRU\WKH\PXVWEHSUHSDUHGWRHQWHU
into a global-level law-making body that can render such property claims appropriately 
¶RPQLODWHUDO· (cf. Ypi, 2014).  
Since the problem of unilateralism is a live issue, then the problem of assurance is too: in 
the particular cosmopolitan context we have been interested in here, we might say that if a 
potential asylum applicant cannot be assured that a legitimate claim to the right to be somewhere 
will be respected by the state they arrive at, then they are themselves under no obligation to respect 
WKDWVWDWH·VFODLPWRLWVWHUULWRU\DQGPD\IRUH[DPSOHVHHNWRHQWHUWKHVWDWHDQ\ZD\7KHVROXWLRQ
to the problem of assurance, to recall, is sovereign executive power. A problem of indeterminacy 
was never denied by the argument from restricted competence even at the level of international 
Right, but clearly there will recur a problem of indeterminacy with respect to cosmopolitan right 
too, since the general principle of hospitality will always require determination in specific instances 
according to the particularities of any one case. The solution here is a global court competent to 
resolve such cases.  
All three problems that lead Kant to offer a sovereign state as the solution to domestic 
right, then, reappear in cosmopolitan right. The argument from restricted competence itself 
therefore points in the direction of a world government when the full scope of the doctrine or right 
is brought into view, since we come to realise that the competences required at the cosmopolitan 
level are not restricted.  
 
The compatibility of cosmopolitan Right and federal world government  
,KDYHDUJXHGWKDWQHLWKHUWKHDUJXPHQWIURPVWDWHV·PRUDOSHUVRQDOLW\QRUWKHGHSLFWLRQRIVWDWHV·
physical personhood entailed by the argument from restricted competence ² both seemingly 
plausible as Kantian arguments for a league of nations when considering international right in 
particular ² can sustain when the concerns of cosmopolitan right are brought into view. I have also 
claimed ² tentatively in the first case, and more firmly in the second case ² that the two arguments 
themselves point in the direction of a world government when cosmopolitan concerns are brought 
to the fore. In closing, I want briefly to consider the counter-claim that world government is not 
conceptually compatible with international and/or cosmopolitan right. 7KLVLVSRWHQWLDOO\.DQW·V
RZQYLHZ DQG LWKDV FHUWDLQO\EHHQ WDNHQ WREH.DQW·VRZQYLHZE\ VRPHRIKLV LQWHUSUHWHUV
Nevertheless, worlGJRYHUQPHQWLVLQP\YLHZFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHHOHPHQWVRI.DQW·VSROLWLFDO
philosophy.  
  Consider first the following claim to the incompatibility of cosmopolitan right with world 
government: 
If Kant had adopted the possibility of a world government, the problems of citizens and strangers 
[i.e. cosmopolitan Right] would not have occurred. All human beings would have been considered 
DVPHPEHUV,WLVWKHUHIRUHREYLRXVWKDWWKLVFRVPRSROLWDQULJKWFRXOGDULVHLQ.DQW·VZULWLQJVRQO\
after he had dropped the possibility of such a world government (Mertens, 1996: 332).  
The claim here then is that cosmopolitan right can only be a coherent idea where there is no world 
JRYHUQPHQW %XW LV WKLV LQ IDFW VR ´REYLRXVµ" As Thomas Mertens characterises things here, 
cosmopolitan rLJKWFRQFHUQVWKH´SUREOHPVRIFLWL]HQVDQGVWUDQJHUVµ2QVXFKDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
for a world government to render cosmopolitan right incoherent, it would need to be the case that 
the existence of a world government would necessarily render impossible a distinction between 
citizens and non-FLWL]HQYLVLWRUV´VWUDQJHUVµ%XWthis need not necessarily be. While it is correct 
that institutionalising cosmopolitan right entails delivering to individuals worldwide certain 
political and legal rights that we typically understand as aspects of citizenship ² and so we can 
choose to speak in terms of the creation of world citizens ² this does not mean that there could 
remain no sub-global forms of citizenship, via which we can continue to make a distinction between 
FLWL]HQVLHFLWL]HQVRIQDWLRQ¶VWDWHV·RUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\QRZIHGHUDOXQLWVDQG´VWUDQJHUVµLH
those who, while sharing in world citizenship, do not share in the lower level form of citizenship). 
To think otherwise is to ignore the fact that the federal-OHYHOJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGKDYH´RQO\WKH
UHVSRQVLELOLW\RIRYHUFRPLQJWKHUHVLGXDOVWDWHRIQDWXUHµ (Höffe, 2006: 194) that remains at the 
cosmopolitan levelxix; such limited responsibility entails only a distinctly minimalist federal 
government that could not rightly erode the distinctions between lower-level citizenships. In 
particular, such a form of world citizenship would not include a right to global freedom of 
movement: it would therefore not render cosmopolitan right incoherent, since it would not impact 
upon the coherence of the principle of hospitality.  
 It might be thought however that this only kicks the conceptual problem back to the level 
of international right. For while ² as was made clear in the first section of this article ² it was not 
LQ IDFW.DQW·V YLHZ WKDWSROLWLFDO FRPPXQLWLHV QHHGHG WR EHRUJDQLVHG DV VWDWHV LQ RUGHU WR EH
relevant subjects of cosmopolitan right, the subjects of international right are indeed taken to be 
sovereign states specifically. But where there exists a sovereign world government ² however 
minimal ² then states (defined partly by their own sovereignty) would no longer exist, since they 
could no longer themselves be fully sovereign under a world government. Interpreters of Kant 
often take his statement WKDW D ´VWDWH RI QDWLRQV«ZRXOG EH D FRQWUDGLFWLRQµ (PP 8:354) to be 
making this kind of point when considering a world government in respect of international right. 
0RUHRYHU.DQWH[SOLFLWO\VWDWHVWKDWLWLVRQO\E\DYROXQWDU\OHDJXHDQG´QRWDIHGHUDWLRQOLNH
WKDWRIWKH$PHULFDQVWDWHVµWKDW´WKHLGHDRIDSXEOLFULJKWRIQDWLRQV>FDQ@EHUHDOLVHGµ00
6:351).  
 When Kant claims in Toward Perpetual Peace that a ¶VWDWH RI QDWLRQV· ZRXOG EH D
FRQWUDGLFWLRQKHVD\VPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\WKDWLWZRXOG´FRQWUDGLFWWKH VXSSRVLWLRQµRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
right. This is true enough in one sense: if there did not exist a world of separate states, then there 
would be no problem of international right to be solved. But to suppose that it follows from this 
that the institutional solution to this problem must entail the continued existence of states is to 
confuse the initial subjects of right with those subjects as they would be transformed in the 
corresponding rightful condition. The world as it faced Kant was a world containing separate 
sovereign states. As such, there necessarily exist problems of international and cosmopolitan right, 
for which states are relevant subjects. But to say that states are relevant subjects of right is not to 
say they must remain states when the relevant rightful condition is finally institutionalised. 
Compare with domestic right: there the relevant subjects are individuals in the state of nature. In 
order to institute domestic right, however, they must cease being individuals of that kind, and 
instead become state citizens. A similar thing can be said about states: while the initial subjects of 
(for example) cosmopolitan right are, today, states and visitors, that does not mean they will 
remain such once the rightful condition between them has been institutionalised. The view offered 
here is that they may instead become, respectively, largely autonomous federal units, and visitors 
who, even if they may find themselves ¶VWDWHOHVV·QRZSRVVHVVDZRUOGFLWL]HQVKLSWKDWDOORZVWKHP
to pursue their external freedom at the cosmopolitan level.  
Kant himself may in any case not have meant his statement about a contradiction in the 
LGHDRID¶VWDWHRIQDWLRQV·WREHDFODLPDERXWFRQFHSWXDOLQFRKHUHQFH.OHLQJHOG·VDUJXPHQW
WKDWIRU.DQWWKH¶FRQWUDGLFWLRQ·VXFKDVLWLVUHODWHVWRWKHpremature ¶IXVLQJWRJHWKHU·RIVHSDUDWH
states, and that such a view is compatible with the idea that a sovereign world government remains 
the institutional ideal, seems to me plausible. After all, Kant does say in Toward Perpetual Peace ² 
WKHVDPHWH[WLQZKLFKKHPDNHVWKH¶FRQWUDGLFWLRQ·FODLP² that a world government is ´FRUUHFW
in thesiµ33, which would be a strange thing to say if he really did think it was conceptually 
incompatible with his system of right. 
What, finally, of the substance of the claim in the Metaphysics of Morals that a voluntary 
league is the only form in which international right can be realised? This too turns out not to be a 
conceptual claim, but rather an empirical one. Here again the ideal of a world government seems 
to be affirmed in principle: were it not practically LPSRVVLEOHLQ.DQW·VYLHZWRJRYHUQDZRUOG
government effectively in practice, then a voluntary league would not be the only form in which 
international right could be realised. Indeed, Kant seems rather to equate the ideal of perpetual 
peace with a world government: precisely because, for him, a world government is not practicable, 
the idea of perpetual peace ultimately UHPDLQVDQ´XQDFKLHYDEOHLGHDµ00,QLWVVWHDG
we must take the voluntary league as our best available approximation.  
 
Bibliography 
Benhabib S (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Benhabib S (2006) Another Cosmopolitanism (Post R ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Brown GW (2009) Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
Brown GW (2010) The laws of hospitality, asylum seekers and cosmopolitan right. European 
Journal of Political Theory 9(3): 308-327. 
Brown GW (2011) Bringing the state back into cosmopolitanism: The idea of responsible 
cosmopolitan states. Political Studies Review 9: 53²66. 
Byrd BS (1995) 7KH VWDWH DV D ¶PRUDO SHUVRQ· ,Q Robinson H (ed.) Proceedings of the Eighth 
International Kant Congress. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 171-189. 
Byrd BS and Hruschka J (2008) From the state of nature to the juridical state of states. Law and 
Philosophy 27(6): 599²641. 
Byrd BS and Hruschka J (2010) .DQW·V'RFWULQHRI5LJKW$&RPPHQWDU\. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Capps P and Rivers J (2010.DQW·VFRQFHSWRI international law. Legal Theory 16(4): 229-257. 
Carson TL (1988) ´Perpetual peacHµ: What Kant should have said. Social Theory and Practice 
14(2): 173-214. 
Cavallar G (1994.DQW·VVRFLHW\RIQations: Free federation or world republic? Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 32(3): 461-482. 
Dahl RA (1999&DQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQVEHGHPRFUDWLF"$VFHSWLF·VYLHZ·,n: Shapiro I 
and Hacker- Cordón C (eds) Democracy's Edges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
19-36. 
Eleftheriadis P (2003) Cosmopolitan law. European Law Journal 9: 241²263 
Flikschuh K (2000) Kant and Modern Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Flikschuh Katrin (2010) .DQW·VVRYHUHLJQW\GLOHPPD$FRQWHPSRUDU\DQDO\VLV Journal of 
Political Philosophy 18(4): 469²493. 
Frege G (1948) Sense and reference. The Philosophical Review 57(3): 209-230. 
Gilabert P and Lawford-Smith H (2012) Political feasibility: A conceptual exploration. Political 
Studies 60(4): 809-825. 
Habermas J (2006) The Divided West. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Held D (1995) Democracy and the Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Hodgson L-P (2012) Realising external freedom: The Kantian argument for a world state. In: 
Ellis E (ed) .DQW·V3ROLWLFDO7KHRU\,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVDQGApplications. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania University Press. 101-134.  
Höffe O (2006) .DQW·V&RVPRSROLWDQ7KHRU\RI/DZDQG3HDFH. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Holland B (2017) The perpetual peace puzzle: Kant on persons and states. Social Theory and 
Practice 43(6): 599-620.  
Huber J (2017a) No right to unilaterally claim your territory: On the consistency of Kantian 
statism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20(6): 677-696. 
Huber J (2017b) Cosmopolitanism for earth dwellers: Kant on the right to be somewhere. 
Kantian Review 22(1), 1-25. 
Kant I (1996) Practical Philosophy (Gregor MJ ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Kant I (2016) Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy (Rauscher F ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
.OHLQJHOG3$SSURDFKLQJSHUSHWXDOSHDFH.DQW·VGefence of a league of states and his 
ideal of a world federation. European Journal of Philosophy 12(3): 304-325.  
Kleingeld P (2012) Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Lutz-%DFKPDQQ0.DQW·VLGHDRISHDFHDQGWKHSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQFHSWLRQRIDZRUOG
republic. In: Bohman J and Lutz-Bachmann M (eds) Perpetual Peace: (VVD\VRQ.DQW·V
Cosmopolitan Ideal. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 59²77. 
0HFNVWURWK&+RVSLWDOLW\RU.DQW·VFULWLTXHRIFRVPRSROLWDQLVPDQGKXPDQULJKWV 
Political Theory. Online first: https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591717719546. 
Mertens T (1996) Cosmopolitanism and citizenship: Kant against Habermas. European Journal of 
Philosophy 4(3): 328²347. 
Mikalsen KK ,QGHIHQFHRI.DQW·VOHDJXHRIVWDWHV Law and Philosophy 30(3): 291²31. 
Muthu S (2000) Justice and foreigners: Kant's cosmopolitan right. Constellations 7: 23²45. 
Niesen P (2007) Colonialism and hospitality. Journal of International Political Theory 3(1): 90-108.  
Pallikkathayil J (2017) Persons and bodies. In: Kisilevsky S and Stone MJ (eds) Freedom and 
)RUFH(VVD\VRQ.DQW·V/HJDO3KLORVRSK\Oxford: Hart. 35-54. 
Perreau-Saussine A (2010) Immanuel Kant on international law. In: Tasioulas J and Beson S 
(eds) The Philosophy of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 53²75  
Pinheiro Walla A (2016) Common possession of the earth and cosmopolitan right. Kant-Studien 
107(1): 160²178. 
Raponi S :KDWLVUHTXLUHGWRLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVH.DQW·VFRVPRSROLWDQLGHDO" Journal of 
International Political Theory 10(3): 302 - 324 
Ripstein A (2009) )RUFHDQG)UHHGRP.DQW·V/HJDODQG3ROLWLFDO3KLORVRSK\. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Stilz A (2014) Provisional right and non-state peoples. In: Flikschuh K and Ypi L (eds) Kant and 
Colonialism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. 197-220.  
United Nations (1951) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html 
Varden H (2011) A Kantian conception of global justice. Review of International Studies 37(5): 
2043-2057 
Ypi L (2011) Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ypi L (2014) A permissive theory of territorial rights. European Journal of Philosophy 22(2): 288²
312. 
 
i Throughout this paper, it will be a federal ZRUOGJRYHUQPHQWVSHFLILFDOO\XQGHUGLVFXVVLRQ$V.DQW·VPRUH
careful interpreters have recognised, it is unitary world government (Universalmonachie) that is the target of 
.DQW·VPRVWQRWRULRXVFRPPHQWVDERXWWKHGDQJHUVRIZRUOGJRYHUQPHQW6HHHJ) Byrd and Hruschka, 
(2010: Ch. 9).  
ii ,Q WKLVSDSHUTXRWHVE\.DQW UHIHUHQFHG ¶00·DQG ¶33· UHIHU WR The Metaphysics of Morals and Toward 
Perpetual Peace UHVSHFWLYHO\7KHVHTXRWHVDUHWDNHQIURP0DU\-*UHJRU·VWUDQVODWLRQVDVFROOHFWHGLQ.DQW
(1996) 4XRWHV UHIHUHQFHG ¶'33· UHIHU WKH GUDIWV IRU Toward Perpetual Peace, as translated by Frederick 
Rauscher, in Kant (2016). In all cases, the numbers that follow the initials refer to the pagination of the 
VWDQGDUG*HUPDQHGLWLRQRI.DQW·VZRUNV.DQW·VGessammelte Schriften.  
iii The brief account to be given here inevitably skips over various interpretative debates relating to the 
JURXQGVRI.DQW·VSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\7KHPDWWHUVDWKDQGLQWKRVHGHEDWHVKRZHYHU² such as the nature 
 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of innate right, and the precise philosophical relation between innate right and acquired rights ² do not bear 
on my argument in this paper.  
iv It might seem obscure that cosmopolitan right could legislate against the colonisation of non-state peoples, 
JLYHQ.DQW·VYLHZWKDWproperty cannot be definitively acquired outside of a state. However, as Anna Stilz 
(2014) has explained, non-state peoples still have a provisional right to territory based on their initial 
acquisition, a right sufficient to preclude such colonising behaviour (see also Nielsen, 2007).  
v See also, for example, Benhabib (2004): 35; Brown (2010): 317. 
vi It is worth noting that neither of the two kinds of argument that I will consider in the main bulk of this 
paper appear to endorse this kind of view about the non-enforceability of cosmopolitan Right.  
vii See also Muthu (2000). 
viii Others who make a similar argument, at varying length, include Cavallar (1994); Holland (2017); and 
+XEHUD$SSHDOWRWKHLGHDRIWKHVWDWHDVD¶PRUDOSHUVRQ·KDVDOVREHHQPDGe in order to defend a 
Kantian world government: see Byrd (1995), who emphasises the idea that states have perfect and imperfect 
moral duties equivalent to those of individuals in a state of nature.   
ix Ben Holland (2017) claims that by focussing on juridical sovereignty, Flikschuh offers too narrow an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI.DQW·VQRWLRQRI WKHVWDWHDVDPRUDOSHUVRQ+ROODQGEHOLHYHVWKDW.DQW·VRSWLQJIRUD
league of nations can only be fully explained by considering the capacity for acting autonomously upon 
GXW\DQGLQSDUWLFXODUE\PRYLQJEH\RQGWKH¶GRFWULQHRI5LJKW·WRFRQVLGHUWKH¶GRFWULQHRI9LUWXH· In my 
DVVHVVPHQWKRZHYHU)OLNVFKXK·VRZQDUJXPHQWLQIDFWDOUHDG\LQFOXGHVDSSHDOWRGXW\QDPHO\WKHGXW\WR
UHDOLVHLQWHUQDWLRQDO5LJKWE\¶VHOI-OHJLVODWLRQ·HYHQZKHUHVXFKOHJLVODWLRQFDQQRWEHH[WHUQDOO\FRHUFLYHO\
enforced.  
x See also Perreau-Saussine (2010).  
xi From here, I will only speak of states and visitors, given that the world today is essentially entirely 
constituted by states.  
xii )RUWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP·VOLVWIRUH[DPSOHVHHKHUH
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/country-policy-and-information-notes 
xiii It might be thought that I am in an uncomfortable position bringing in an argument about incredible 
idealisation here, given that one might equally make an infeasibility argument about world government, as 
indeed Kant himself at tLPHVDSSHDUVWRGR:HFDQKRZHYHUGUDZDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ¶KDUG·DQG¶VRIW·
feasibility constraints. There are at least some potential causes of statelessness ² like natural disasters ² that 
are beyond human control and are therefore (as far as we know LQHYLWDEOH 7KDW PDNHV WKHP D ¶KDUG·
feasibility constraint which necessarily leaves open the ongoing relevance of the category of stateless person. 
By contrast, both a world of separate republican states, and a world government, are both presumably at 
least physically possible, even if implausible any time soon ² WKH\DUHWKXV¶VRIW·FRQVWUDLQWV2QKDUGDQG
soft feasibility constraints, see Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012).  
xiv See, for example, Held (1995).  
xv There is another way to reject the argument from restricted competence which has been suggested by Japa 
Pallikkathayil (2017). Pallikkathayil argues that bodily rights in the individual state of nature suffer the same 
full range of problems (i.e. acquisition, indeterminacy and assurance) as property rights; the need for a state 
can then be demonstrated by reference to bodily rights alone. As Pallikkathayil notes in passing (2017: fn. 
LWIROORZVWKDW.DQWFRXOGQRWUHMHFWDZRUOGJRYHUQPHQWE\FRQFHLYLQJRIVWDWHV·WHUULWRULHVDVHTXLYDOHQW
to SHUVRQV·ERGLHV0\PRYHKHUHKRZHYHULVLQVWHDGWRUHMHFWWKHLGHDWKDWVWDWHV·WHUULWRULHVcan be morally 
equivalent to bodies across all forms of right.   
xvi Transplants and modern prosthetics begin to complicate this story.  
xvii This might strike some as incorrect. Consider, for example, holy or otherwise nationally culturally 
significant land. It is quite possible that such land may be considered by some to be a necessary part of a 
VWDWH·VLGHQWLW\%XWWKDWLWPD\EHWKRXJKWRILQWKLVZD\GRHVQRWSUHclude the ultimate contingency of such 
significance. Rather, such significance comes about precisely on account of a historical story ² of battles won 
and lost, ideas risen and fallen, and so on ² which might have been otherwise.. 
xviii 7KHDV\OXPDSSOLFDQW·VFODLPWRRFFXS\WHUULWRU\KRZHYHUQHHGQ·W LWVHOIEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDFODLPWR
property acquisition. See Huber (2017b). 
xix %\ WKH ¶UHVLGXDO VWDWHRIQDWXUH·+|IIHKLPVHOIPHDQV WR VSHDNRI WKH international state of nature. By 
contrast, I have here granted that a world government may not be needed to overcome the international 
state of nature, and instead focussed on the residual cosmopolitan state of nature.  
